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ANIMALS-INURIES BY-REsPONSIBILITY OF OWNER.-LYMAN V. DALE,
171 S. W. (Mo.) 352.Held, every Missouri mule has one kick.
Anyone keeping a wild animal does so at his own risk and is responsi.
ble for whatever damage it may do. Phillips v. Garner, 64 So. (Miss.)
735 (monkey); Hays v. Mille, 43 So. (Ala.) 818 (wolf). But the owner
of a domestic animal is not responsible for damage it does, if it is
rightfully in the place where the mischief was done, unless it is shown,
not only that the animal was vicious, but also that the owner or keeper
had knowledge of that fact. Kitchens v. Elliott, 114 Ala. 290; Dix z.
Somerset Coal Co., 217 Mass. 146; Carney v. Donk Bros. Co., 169 Ill.
App. 124; Earl v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 630 (bees). Therefore
the owner of a horse is not liable in damages to the first person that
horse bites. Reed v. Southern Ex. Co., 95 Ga. io8. So a dog has one
bite. Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 Ill. 382. This, however, is changed by
statute in some states. See Legault v. Malacker, 156 Wis. 507. Likewise
the owner of a cat is entitled to notice of its dangerous propensities.
McDonald v. Jodrey, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 142.
The principal case is correct and the concurring opinion of Lamm, J.,
is one of the finest examples of sustained judicial humor to be found
in the books.
BILLS & NOTES-WRONGFUL TRANSFER-RIGHT OF AcTioN.-PATTERsON
& Co. v. PETERSON, 84 S. E. (GA.) 163.-Held, the wrongful transfer of
a negotiable note to a bona fide purchaser, thereby cutting off the maker's
valid defense, gives rise to a cause of action for the damages resulting
therefrom.
For a discussion of this and kindred points, see comment in 24 Yale
Law Journal 419, written before the principal case appeared.
BURGLARY-ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE-FORCIBLE BREAKING."-GoINs ET
AL. v. STATE, 107 N. E. (OHIO) 335.-Held, where any force, however
slight, is required to effect an entrance into a building through a door-
way partly open, such act constitutes a forcible breaking.
Breaking is any act of physical force by which an obstruction to enter-
ing is forcibly removed. Metz v. State, 46 Neb. 507. Though the word
breaking implies the use of force, it is universally held that the slightest
force will be sufficient. State v. Lapoint, 88 At. (Vt.) 523; Bass v.
State, I Lea (Tenn.) 444; State v. Snow, 51 AtI. (Del:) 6o7; Common-
wealth v. Stephenson, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 354. Entry through an opening
which is an unusual place has been held to constitute a breaking. Dona-
hoo v. State, 36 Ala. 281; Knotts v. State, 32 S. W. (Tex.) 532; Mar-
shall v. State, 94 Ga. 589. It is a sufficient breaking to push open a
door held by friction against the sill, or to raise a window which is
completely closed but unlocked. Parker v. State, 38 S. W. (Tex.) 79o;
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May v. State, 4o Fla. 426; State v. Henderson, 212 Mo. 208. Where the
outer door is open, merely opening an unlocked inner door is a breaking.
State v. Scripture, 42 N. H. 485; Rolland v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 66.
But entering by an unobstructed opening is not a breaking. State v.
Hart, 77 S. E. (S. C.) 862; Smith v. Commonwealth, 128 S. W. (Ky.)
68. Where entry is made through a door or window partly open, there
is a conflict. Leaving the door or window ajar, even to a slight degree,
would constitute such an invitation that opening further would not
amount to a burglarious breaking. May's Criminal Law, p. 244. This is
the law in England. Rex v. Smith, i Moody 178; Rex v. Hyams, 7
C. & P. 441. And it is the weight of authority in this country. Common-
wealth v. Strupney, 1o5 Mass. 508; Collins v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky.
698. The holding of the principal case lays down the opposite rule,
namely, that where entry is made through a partly open window or door
by pushing it further open, there is a sufficient breaking, and is supported
by the more recent decisions. Claiborn v. State, 83 S. W. (Tenn.) 352;
People v. White, 153 Mich. 617, State v. Sorenson, 138 N. W. (Iowa)
411; State v. Lapoint, supra. The decision of the principal case is logical
and reasonable, and is in accord with the later burglary statutes which
require no breaking at all.
COMMERCE-INTERSTATE COMMERE-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-McAULIFF
v. NEW YoRic CENT. & H. R. R. Co., I5o N. Y. S. 512. Plaintiff, a
conductor of a freight train, took it from the New Jersey terminal
into New York and the next day was employed in carrying freight
between two New York points. The following day, while returning to
the New Jersey terminal he was injured. In a suit for damages under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, claiming that at the time of his
injury he was engaged in interstate commerce, held, that plaintiff was not
so engaged when he was injured. Stapleton and Rich, JJ., dissenting.
To bring the employee within the Act the employer must be engaged
in interstate commerce and the employee must be therein employed. St.
Louis R. Co. v. Scale, 229 U. S. I56; Pedasen v. D. L. & W. R. Co.,
229 U. S. 146. The acts of a fireman in preparing his engine for a trip
in interstate commerce have been held to bring him within the Act.
N. C. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248. An employee injured while
repairing a refrigerator car, used indiscriminately in interstate and intra-
state commerce, comes within the Act. N. P. R. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed.
i. A repairer of a switch used for both interstate and intrastate com-
merce is within the Act. Calasurdo v. Cent. R. of N.J., 192 Fed. 9o1. So
also a servant who was acting as a watchman or caretaker of a "dead"
engine, which was being hauled by an interstate train from one state to
another. Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Jones, 63 So. 693. Likewise a fire-
man under orders to take transportation to relieve a fireman on an inter-
state commerce train. Lamphere v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 196 Fed. 336.
The courts construe the Act as broadly and liberally as possible. Beh-
rens v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 192 Fed. 58I. The principle which the decisions
lay down is that if the effect of the injury or death of the employee is
to directly hinder, delay or impede interstate commerce, the employee is
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brought within the provisions of the Act. This case is on the border line,
but from the evidence seems sound.
CoNTRAcTs-AsslGNXa ENT-SALE ON CREDIT-PERsoNAL TRUST AND CON-
FIDENCE.-MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM Co. v. HAVOLINE AUTO SUPPLY Co., 172
S. W. (TEx.) 759.-Held, that a contract to sell on credit such quantity
of gasoline as the obligee might need for his business, subject to maxi-
mum and minimum limitations, is non-assignable, as involving personal
credit, trust, and confidence.
It is agreed, wherever the question has been squarely presented, that a
contractual obligation is never assignable in such sense as to enable the
assignor to divest himself of his original liability. Martin v. Orndorff,
22 Iowa 5o4; Currier v. Taylor, i9 N. H. i89. It follows that a vendor on
credit would still have recourse to the original vendee after an assign-
ment by the latter. Nevertheless it has been usual not to allow an assign-
ment of the rights of a purchaser on credit. Demarest v. Duhton Lumber
Co., 88 C. C. A. (U. S.) 310; Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., zIg Ga., 597;,
Hardy Implement Co. v. Iron Works, 129 Mo. 222. Some of these cases
might better have gone upon the insolvency of the original purchaser
and the consequent right of the vendor to repudiate. Demarest v. Dun-
ton Lumber Co., supra. Indeed in such cases an assignment has sometimes
been allowed, conditioned upon an undertaking of immediate payment
by the assignee, on the questionable assumption that a cash sale involves
no relation of trust and confidence. In re Niagara Radiator Co., 164 Fed.
lO2. A contract right is assignable unless a relation of personal confi-
dence is involved on the part of obligor toward obligee. Bonding &
Trust Co. v. R. R. Co., 6o C. C. A. (U. S.) 52. Often the right is
non-assignable because inseparable from a duty of the assignor which
involves personal confidence. R. R. Co. v. Bedgood, 116 Ga. 945. Cf.
City of Philadelphia v. Locklurdt, 73 Pa. St. 211. But sometimes a con-
fidential relationship is involved in the intrinsic nature of the right itself,
irrespective of the admissibility of a substituted performance of the
assignor's duty. Redheffer v. Leathe, i5 Mo. App. 12 (contract of hiring);
Glass Co. v. Land Co., 35 Ind. App. 45 (contract to supply gas to meet
needs of neighboring factory). This, on principle, is eminently true
of rights involving the exercise of an option. McQueen v. Chouteau, 20
Mo. 222 (option to select). This is well recognized in the case of an
undertaking of guaranty for such advances as should be made by the
obligee. Friedlander v. Plate-Glass Insurance Co., 38 App. Div. (N. Y.)
146; Schoonover v. Osborne, io8 Iowa 453. By the weight of authority
however, rights involving options are assignable. Rice v. Gibbs, 33 Neb.
46o (option to purchase); Horner v. Wood, 23 N. Y. 350 (option to
extend continuance of contract); R. R. Co. v. Gluck, 31 Tex. Civ. App.
211 (option as to quantity); Oil & Mineral Co. v. Babb., 122 La. 415
(option as to quantity). Contra, R. R. v. Bedgood and Demarest v. Dun.
ton Lumber Co., supra (option as to quantity). The principal case
ignores the question last raised; its ratio decidendi, while supported by
authorities, overlooks the distinction between an admissible substitution
of performance and an inadmissible assignment of a liability.
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DobMIcILE-Do IcrLE OF CHOICE-INTENT.-BAKER ET AL. V. BAKER,
ECCLES & CO. ET AL., 173 S. W. (Ky.) iog.-Held, where a person has
removed to a place with an intention of remaining there indefinitely, that
becomes his domicile, despite an indefinite "floating intention" to return
to his place of former abode at some time.
Most of the cases hold that to effect a change of domicile there must
be residence in the new location, with an intention to remain there.
Eisele v. Oddie, 128 Fed. 941; Cabot v. City of Boston, 66 Mass. 52. If
there is an intention to return at a definite future time, the former place
continues to be the domicile. Collins v. City of Ashland, 112 Fed. 175.
The difficulty in the cases, however, comes when there is a change of
actual residence, but no animus inanendi. it re Titterington's Estate, 13o
Iowa 356, held that domicile could not be defeated by mere vague intent
to return at some future time. Contra, State v. Snyder, 182* Mo. 462. An
extreme case holding that intent does not control is that of Cruger v.
Phelps, 47 N. Y. Supp. 61, where a native of New York resided in Europe
with his family the greater part of the time for 5o years before his
death, and stated that he preferred Europe and intended to make it his
home in the future. Despite these declarations, it was held New York
continued to be his domicile. Some cases make the question of inten-
tion decisive. Maslin's Ex'rj v. Hiett, 37 W. Va. 15. The rule of the
principal case seems to be in accord with the weight of the decided cases
and clearly correct in principle, in that it gives effect to the legal results
of acts rather than the legal results intended in defiance of them.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-PRIORITIES OF CLAIms-FNERAL
EXPENSES-MONYUMENTS.-IN a LEsTER's ESTATE, 150 N. W. (IowA)
1033.-Held, under a statute providing that as soon as the executor or
administrator has sufficient means he shall pay charges of deceased's
last sickness and the funeral expenses,-the expense of a tombstone may
be allowed after paying the expenses of the last sickness although the
estate is insolvent. It is not strictly a funeral expense but the court
can in its sound discretion so regard it.
The general rule is that expenses for tombstones are proper as part of
the funeral expenses. Pierce v. Fulmer, 165 Ala. 344; Phillipps v. Duck-
ett, 112 Ill. App. 587. Such an allowance is sometimes provided for by
statute. Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 3885. But the expenditure for such a
purpose must be reasonable considering all the circumstances of the
deceased. In re Koppikus' Estate, i Cal. App. 84; Pease v. Christman,
supra. It has been held on the other hand, however, that the cost of
a tombstone never can be included under funeral expenses. Hisem v.
Lemel's Curator, i9 La. 425. Where the estate is insolvent, as in the
principal case, the courts differ in allowing such claims. In England the
rule' is that no more than is necessary should be allowed and some
courts have fixed an arbitrary maximum at £io for all the funeral
expenses. East India Co. v. Skinner, Comb. 342. The American cases,
as a rule, hold that the Probate Court may allow a reasonable expendi-
ture for a tombstone even where the estate is insolvent. Fairman's
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Appeal, 30 Conn. 2o5; Ferrier v. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315; Crapo v. Arm-
strong, 61 Iowa 697. But such an allowance was refused in Little v.
Williams, 7 Il. App. 67. The principal case seems to be in accord with
the better American view in leaving the matter to the discretion of the
court having supervision of the settlement of the estate.
HoMICIDE-CAuSES OF DEATH.-PEOPLE V. KANE, 107 N. E. (N. Y.)
655.-Held, where defendant's shooting deceased - caused a miscarriage,
followed by blood poisoning, from which she died, it is no defense that
medical negligence intervened to cause death, unless such negligence was
the sole cause of the death.
Notwithstanding the numerous conflicting dicta found in the reports,
the actual adjudications in this country are overwhelmingly in accord
with the principal case. People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551; Thompson v.
L. & N. R. R. Co., 91 Ala. 496. One inflicting an unlawful bodily injury
is accountable for all consequences that flow from the injury in natural
sequence. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 564. And medical attention,
though erroneous and negligent, is in natural sequence. Perdue v. State,
69 S. E. (Ga.) 184. Although the chain of causation is broken by the
intervention of an independent wrongdoer or disease, the original injury
does not necessarily cease to operate as a cause of death ensuing within
a year and a day from the inflicting thereof. People v. Lewis, supra.
To excuse the original wrongdoer, it must appear that the intervening
independent agency was the sole cause; that is, that at the moment of
death the original injury was not contributing at all to the fact of the
dying. Hollywood z. State, 12o Pac. (Wyo.) 471; State v. Foote, 58 S. C.
218; Thompson v. R. R. Co., supra; Wagner v. Woolsey, 48 Tenn. 235.
And the presumption on this point is prima facie against the accused.
State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa 27o; Loew v. State, 6o Wis. 559. But the
accused may in each case show to the jury the extent of the wound
inflicted by him to aid them in their determination. Wilson v. State, 24
S. W. (Tex.) 4o9. In Texas, by statute, the general rule as to inter-
vening agencies does not apply where the intervening agency consists of
improper treatment. Penal Code, Art. 652. In a few jurisdictions the
rule of the principal case is not followed, on the theory that its appli-
cation involves the punishing of mere intent and the absurdity of having
more than one murder of the same man. State v. Wood, 53 Vt. 56o;
State v. Angelina, So S. E. (W. Va.) 141. But this view overlooks the
point that the homicide does not occur as a fact until death ensues within
a year and a day, no matter how many persons may have done wrongful
acts which contribute as causes of the death. Coin. v. Macloon, IOI
Mass. i; Robbins v. State, 8 Oh. St. 131.
HuSBAND AN- WIFE--"DEsETIoN."--WucH v. STATE, 67 So. (Fi.)
224.-Held, that the word "desertion" has a broader meaning than mere
physical separation, and that under the title "An act to provide punish-
ment for the desertion of wife or child," the legislature may punish the
withholding of means of support from such dependents.
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The term desertion as used in reference to husband and wife is gen-
erally held to contemplate a voluntary separation of one party from the
other, without justification, with the intention of not returning. Wil-
liams v. Williams, 13o N. Y. 193; Kikell v. Kikell, 25 Nebr. 256, 41 N. W.
i8o. "Wilful desertion is the voluntary separation of one of the married
parties from the other with the intent to desert." Rev. Codes of N. Dak.
i9o5, Sec. 4052. The word "desertion" as used in connection with the
marital relation is synonymous with "abandonment." People v. Crouse,
83 N. Y. Supp. 812; State v. Weber, 48 Mo. App. 500, 504. Absence is
desertion, as the term "desertion" is used making such act a ground for
divorce. Elzas v. Elzas, 171 Ill. 632, 49 N. E. 717. By the weight of
authority the refusal of sexual intercourse does not constitute desertion.
Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436; Southwick v. Southwick, 97 MasG. 327;.
Segelbaurn v. Segelbaum, 39 Minn. 258; Contra, Whitfield v. Whitfield,
89 Ga. 471; Evans v. Evans, 93 Ky. 51O; Rector v. Rector, 78 N. J. Eq.
386. Upon the point involved in the principal case what little authority
there is seems to support a contrary rule, namely, that non-support is
not sufficient to constitute desertion. Proudlove v. Proudlove, 46 Atl.
(N. J.) 951; Howell v. Howell, 64 N. J. Eq. 191; Bennett v. Bennett,
43 Conn. 413; Hammond v. Hammond, 15 R. I. 4o. To hold that non-
support is desertion, is to add a meaning to the latter term which does
not seem justified by its use in either ordinary or legal phraseology.
INsURANcE-REVIVER AFTER TEMPORARY BREAcH OF CONDITION.-COTING-
HAM V. MARYLAND MOTOR CAR INS. Co., 84 S. E. (N. C.) 274-Held, that
a chattel mortgage given on the insured property merely suspended the
policy and the removal of the incumbrance revived the insurance, even
though the policy provided that it should be "void . . . if the prop-
erty hereby insured be or become incumbered by a chattel mortgage."
The court made no attempt to review all the conflicting decisions on
this question nor to reconcile them for the reason that it would have been
impossible. In the case of a warranty the weight of authority seems to
be that a breach ipso facto avoids the policy, though the breach be but
temporary in character, and that there can be no reviver except by con-
sent of the insurer; that is, there must be a new contract. Kyte v. Com.
Union Ass. Co., 149 Mass. II6; Fernandez v. Great Western Ins. Co.,
48 N. Y. 571. Logically the breach of a condition should have the same
effect as a breach of warranty but the weight of authority does not so
consider it. The cases allowing a reviver where there is no provision in
the policy against change of interest by mortgage may perhaps be dis-
tinguished though the same reasons are given in both. Worthing v.
Bearse, 12 Allen 382; Lane v. Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 Me. 44. The
confusion is made worse by the fact that the same courts have arrived
at different conclusions in dealing with different conditions and sometimes
with the same condition. Compare Tompkins'v. Hartfotd Fire Ins. Co.,
49 N. Y. Supp. 184 with the dictum in Gray v. Guardian Ass. Co., 31 N. Y.
Supp. 237; Ring v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 145 Mass. 426 (holding that
vacancy merely suspended the policy); Hinckly v. Germania Fire Ins.
Co., 14o Mass. 38 (holding that temporary failure to renew license for a
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billiard table as provided did not avoid the policy) ; Kyte v. Com. Union
Ass. Co., supra; Hill v. Middlesex Mit. Assier. Co., 174 Mass. 542 (holding
that increase of risk absolutely forfeited the policy). The courts of Illi-
nois have often and consistently held that a breach of condition merely
suspends the policy. Trader's Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256 (increase of
risk); Gerinatia Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599 (other insurance) ;
Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Garland, io8 Ill. 220 (unoccupancy); Crete
Farmers Mit. Twp. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 70 Ill. App. 599 (unauthorized use
of the premises). For a review of the authorities see Sumter Tobacco
Warelouse Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., io L. R. A. (N. S.) 736, 56 S. E.
(S. C.) 654. The cases allowing reviver of a policy after a temporary
breach of condition have stretched the rule that policies of insurance
are construed in favor of the insured. The only remedy for the con-
flicting state of the law on practically every question in insurance is a
uniform statute such as the Sales Act and the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
JUDGMENT-COLLATERAL ATTAcK-ERRoR-FRAUD.-YOUNG V. WILEY, 107
N.-E. (IND.) 278.-Held, a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
cannot be collaterally impeached because erroneous, though it may be
impeached for want of jurisdiction or because it was procured through
fraud.
A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in
a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correct-
ing or modifying such judgment or decree. 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law 848. Errors of law which might be corrected on appeal by proper
proceedings cannot be made the ground of collateral attack on a judg-
ment. Jones v. Edernan, 223 Mo. 312. Whenever judgment is absolutely
void, it is subject to collateral attack. Barnett v. Baier Cooperage Co.,
145 Ky. 163. A judgment or decree rendered without jurisdiction is
absolutely void. Buffum v. Ramsdell, 55 Me. 252; Denk v. Fiel, 249 Ill.
424. The test of jurisdiction is whether the court had power to enter
upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion was right or wrong.
Board of Comm. of Lake Couty v. Platt, 79 Fed. 567. And where the
court has jurisdiction to enter a default, a judgment on default is as
conclusive against collateral attack as any other form of judgment.
Ruppin v. McLachlen, 122 Iowa 343. In order to make a judgment void,
the want of jurisdiction over the parties or the subject-matter must appear
on the face of the judgment record. Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391. But a
few courts hold that the recital of the record does not impart absolute
verity and may be controverted by evidence aliunde. Ferguson v. Craw-
ford, 86 N. Y. 6og. Where court had jurisdiction of the parties and sub-
ject-matter, it is well settled that the judgment is not void, though errone-
ous, and cannot be impeached collaterally. Smith v. Schlink, 44 Colo. 200;
Torey v. Bruner, 6o Fla. 365. A judgment will not be set aside in a
collateral proceeding because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument
or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented
and considered in the judgment assailed. United States v. Throck-
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morton, 98 U. S. 6i. Nor could a judgment be questioned collaterally
for fraud at common law. Nelson v. Felsing, 32 App. D. C. 42o. How-
ever, equity will grant relief by setting aside a judgment obtained by
fraud, where the fraud was extrinsic to the matter on which the judg-
ment was rendered. French v. Raymond. 82 Vt. i56; Graves v. Graves,
132 Iowa i99.
WITNESSES-IMPEACHMiENT-RIGHT TO IMPEAcH.-PEoPLE V. DEMARTINI,
107 N. E. (N. Y.) 5oI.-Where, in a prosecution for homicide, the
main question was defendant's identity, and the state introduced wit-
nesses on such issue whose testimony was destroyed on cross-examination,
although this testimony was a surprise, it was held error to permit the
state to impeach them by proving that they had identified accused as the
murderer both at the police station and in their testimony before the
coroner. Miller and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting..
As a general rule a party may not introduce evidence to prove his
own witness at different times made declarations at variance with his
testimony. Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24; Chamberlain v. Sands, 27 Me. 458.
But most of the cases make an exception where a party is surprised
by the testimony of his witness. Moore v. Railroad Co., 59 Miss. 243;
Harlburt v. Bellows, 5o N. H. IO5. In Massachusetts, however, a rigid
exclusionary rule was adhered to (Adams v. Wheeler, 13 Gray 67), until
the rule was changed by statute. Revised Laws, I902, c. 175 sec. 24. In
Connecticut it is held that it is within the court's discretion to allow the
party to interrogate his witness as to former inconsistent statements.
Appeal of Carpenter, 74 Conn. 431. But a third party can not be called
for this purpose. Wheeler v. Thomas, 67 Conn. 577. In Ballard v.
Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 23o, there was a ruling similar to the last case. An
exception on the ground of surprise was conceded in Coulter v. Express
Co., 56 N. Y. 585, but the New York law was definitely settled in accord
with the ruling of the principal case in Becker v. Koch, 1O4 N. Y. 394.
The weight of authority is contrary to this view, some cases holding
that a party may impeach his witness in any way except as to bad
character. White v. State, io Tex. App. 381; Owens v. State, 46 Tex.
Cr. R. 14. The theory of the cases that admit such testimony qualifiedly
is differently expressed. New York goes on the theory of "probing
recollection." Ballard v. Pearsall, supra. But in general it seems to be
because the rule of absolute exclusion works badly, and in -the states
where the rule has not been relaxed by judicial construction it has been
changed by statute.
